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SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
PATENT-ANTITRUST LAW*
NEWELL A. CLAPP**

I was glad to be able to accept Mr. Prudell's invitation to be here
to night and join you in this very enjoyable occasion. Wisconsin is my
native state, and I have many friends here. Needless to say, it is
always very pleasant to see them and to meet,some of their friends.
While Mr. Prudell did not specify the subject to be discussed, he
did suggest that you would be interested in our views "as respects
patents and anti-trust matters, both apart and 'hooked together'."
Within the area of that generalization, I thought it would be of
inerest to outline and comment on some of the recent developments
in what might be termed "patent-anti-trust law"--a subject in which,
during the past few years, a great deal of interest has developed.
GENERAL BACKGROUND

At the outset, I think it would be of value briefly to review the
background of these interrelated laws and mention at least some of
the points at which they touch each other.
The anti-trust laws, while not expressly provided for in our
Constitution, are an embodiment of the common law rule that monopolies and unreasonable restraints of trades are illegal. Moreover, our
antitrust laws are based upon our economic philosophy of free enterprise and private initiative. The legislative history of the Sherman
Act makes it clear that it was designed to protect free competition in
the market place.
Under this system of free competition, our nation has achieved
its remarkable industrial growth and has produced an enviable standard of living. Management, labor and the consumer alike have been
the beneficiaries of this system.
A patent system was contemplated and provided for by the Constitution when, in Section 8 of Article 1, Congress was given the power
to "promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." This general authorization resulted in our patent laws, which have remained unchanged in principle to the present time.
The patent laws provide for a grant to the first and original inventor of the exclusive right to make, use and sell his invention through* Address delivered before the Milwaukee Patent Law Association, October 30,
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**Acting Assistant Attorney General of the United States.
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out the United States for a term of seventeen years. The term originally was fixed at fourteen years, and it is interesting to note a proposal, which has gained some support, which would limit to twenty
years the overall period from the date of the first application to the
expiration of the patent.
It might be said that the essence of what the patentee obtains from
the patent is the right to exclude others.
I think it must be conceded that the concept of free competition is
least
to a certain degree in conflict with that of the patent monopoly.
at
Nonetheless, each system has its proper and well-deserved place in our
economic society. Intelligent public policy requires that each perform
its rightful function and that, in so functioning, they together contribute to the common good.
The patent grant has been considered both as a property right and
a
as privilege or franchise. Thp view that a patent is a privilege rather
than a property right has been strongly criticized. The difference,
however, would appear to be in the peculiar relationship which this
type of property has to our competitive system.
The idea of a patent being an absolute property right, and like
any other property, stems from the view that a patent is a contract
between the Government and the patentee, whereby, in consideration
of the disclosure of a new invention, the inventor receives the right
to exclude others from making, using or selling it. It is not necessary
to take issue here with such a view except to suggest that the patent
is not just like any other form of property, in that it is easily susceptible of abuses which adversely affect competition in the production and marketing of the nation's goods to an extent and in a manner not true of.ordinary property.
As is plainly indicated in the Constitutional provision, and as the
Supreme Court has pointed out many times, the main object of the
patent laws is to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.
The public interest in the patent grant is of paramount importance.
Although the reward to the inventor is also important, it is of secondary consideration.
The patent grant gives limited rights to the patentee. The Supreme
Court made it clear in the Morton Salt case' that "public policy . ..
excludes from it [the grant] all that is not embraced in the invention."
Thus, the limits of the grant are fixed by the patentee's claimed invention. The patent statutes compel the inventor to say exactly what he
claims. That is important both to the patentee and to the public. As
the Supreme Court has stated: "The limits of a patent must be known
for the protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive
'Morton Salt Company v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492, 62 S.Ct. 402,
405, 86 L.Ed. 363, 366 (1942).
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genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the patent will
2
be dedicated ultimately to the public."
This doctrine of strict construction of the patent grant is a patent
law doctrine. However, it also has antitrust implications when a
patentee attempts to use his patent as a device to accomplish results
which would otherwise be clearly in violation of the antitrust laws.
Mr. Justice McKenna back in 1912 expressed it well when he said:
"Rights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive,
but they do not give more than other rights a universal license against
positive prohibitions. " 3
The antitrust problems concerning patents do not usually arise from
the patent grant itself but from the way in which patents are handled, including their assignment, licensing, acquisition and pooling.
Thus, it is usually the combination or exchange of patent rights, or
the conditions and restrictions imposed in license agreements, which
cause trouble. The question often is whether a particular restriction
in a license is within or without the patent grant.
It is evident, or should be, that the use of the patent grant as a
means of giving effect to a combination of competitors to regulate
or control an industry is illegal. Other types of violations which
concern patents may not be as clear cut, but the courts have laid down
rather well-defined rules in most areas. There are well reasoned
and sound principles in these decisions to which all of us may resort
when attempting to decide which transactions are consistent with and
valid under the antitrust laws and which are not.
New statutes and new decisions of course may raise questions, and
for a time their implications may not be clear. Some of the recent
developments I shall mention tonight raise such questions. In this
connection, one further observation probably should be made at this
point. In antitrust litigation, the alleged illegality of a patent arrangement usually must be determined in light of the whole, more or less
complex factual situation, of which the facts relating to the use made
of the patent (or patents) are simply a part. This commonly present
necessity for taking into account the entire factual picture in determining whether or not the antitrust laws have been violated has often
led to the lament that these laws are much too indefinite, with the
consequence that the business community cannot determine, even with
legal advice, the legality or illegality of a particular course of action
being followed or under consideration. Such a view is entirely too
pessimistic. The majority of antitrust cases involve arrangements
2 General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 58 S.Ct.
899, 902, 82 L.Ed. 1402, 1405 (1938).
3 Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Company v. U.S., 226 U.S. 20, 49, 33 S.Ct.
9, 15, 57 L.Ed. 107, 117 (1912).
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repeatedly condemned by the courts. It is the unusual case which does
not fall within the well-defined areas of illegality.
So much for the background, with which all of us are familiar.
Let us look at some of the recent developments in this interlocking
field of patents and antitrust enforcement.
THE NEW PATENT CODE

The new patent code enacted by the 82nd Congress 4 goes into effect
January first of next year. The Antitrust Division has been interested in and sympathetic to the codification of the patent laws, but it
was opposed to the idea of codifying the law and at the same time
making substantive changes which might adversely affect the antitrust
laws. The revisers have indicated that, in the main, no substantive
changes were intended.
Only two sections of the new code appear to have direct antitrust
implications. One is Section 293-"Nonresident patentees; service
and notice." This section provides that nonresident patentees may file
a designation of an agent for service of process or notice of proceedings "affecting the patent or rights thereunder." It further provides
that, whether or not any such agent is appointed, the District Court
for the District of Columbia shall have the same jurisdiction to take
any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder as it would have
if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the court.
This section 293 may well prove to be of considerable help to the
Government in cartel cases in which foreign co-conspirators owning
U. S. patents are not otherwise within the court's jurisdiction. In
past cartel cases, the insertion of unreasonably restrictive provisions in
patent licenses has been one of favorite means used in carrying out
conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Section 271 of the new code relates to patent misuse and contributory infringement, and may have a more direct Antitrust significance.
In an introductory note to a recent article in the American Bar
Association's Journal 5 discussing patent case law, the editors indicated that, in their opinion, the new patent code had overturned the
court decisions on these two patent law doctrines. I assume they were
referring to this section, but I doubt the validity of their comment.
Let's first look at the existing law on patent misuse as it concerns
"tie-in" arrangements, which is a good descriptive term referring to
schemes requiring the purchase of unpatented goods for use with
patented apparatus, combinations or processes.
The Government has attacked these "tie-in" arrangements under
section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act. The
4Pub. L. No. 593, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess. Cl. 593 (July 19, 1952).

5 38 A.B.AJ. 739 (1952).
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latter section deals specifically with "tie-ins," making them unlawful
where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
In private royalty and infringement cases, the courts have held
that a patentee who has missued his patent comes into court with
"unclean hands" and, accordingly, is not entitled to relief. The ambit
of forbidden patent misuse includes the situation where the patentee
has attempted to extend the scope of his patent to include materials
which are not part of the grant.
In 1917, the Supreme Court decided the case of Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Filn Manufacturing Co.," in which it denied
recovery for infringement where a notice was attached to a patented
projector that it could only be used with film made by the patentee.
The court held that there could be no recovery in a contributory infringement suit brought against a competing film manufacturer who
supplied film to a user of the patent machine. This case overruled
previous cases which had allowed recovery in similar situations on the
theory of contributory infringement. The court took note of the fact
that, in the intervening time, Congress had enacted section 3 of the
Clayton Act but the decision was not based upon that statute . The
Motion Picture Patents case was the first time the doctrine of patent
misuse was applied by the Supreme Court.
In the Carbice case7 in 1931, the Supreme Court condemned an
arrangement whereby dry ice, which was unpatented, was sold by a
patentee with a notice attached that it could only be used with a
patented refrigeration package, and that the package could only be
used with dry ice purchased from the patentee.
The Mercoid cases8 created the greatest stir with respect to the
patent misuse doctrine. In the first Mercoid case,9 the Mid-Continent
Company owned a patent on a furnace assembly or combination. It
granted an exclusive license to Minneapolis-Honeywell with the right
to sub-license others. The royalty payments, however, were to be
based only on the sale of an unpatented stoker switch (the patent on
it had expired) which was an element of the combination. Minneapolis-Honeywell, in advertising the stoker switch, stated that the right
to use the combination patent was granted to the user only when the
stoker switch was purchased from it and used in combination. Thestoker switch had no other use than as part of the patented combina6 243 U.S. 502, 37 S.Ct. 416, 61 L.Ed. 871 (1917).
7 Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patent Development Corp., 283 U.S.
27, 51 S.Ct. 334, 75 L.Ed. 819 (1931).
8
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661, 64 S.Ct. 268, 88
L.Ed. 376 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co.,
320 U.S. 680, 64 S.Ct. 278, 88 L.Ed. 396 (1944).
9 Supra, note 8.
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tion. The court held that this practice was in effect a "tie-in" arrangement-a license of a patent on condition that the licensee purchase
unpatented parts exclusively from the patentee or his exclusive licensee.
This was felt to be a misuse of the patent and no recovery for contributory infringement was allowed when suit was brought against an
unlicensed supplier of the stoker switch. A whole line of cases has
followed the Mercoid decision in which the courts have condemned
similar attempts to extend the patent grant.
With this decisional law in mind, let's turn to the new section 271.
Subsections (c) and (d) are most pertinent here. Subsection (c)
defines contributory Ninfringement, stating that:
"Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material
part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent,
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer."
As to this subsection, the revisers point out that it "is much more
restricted than many proponents of contributory infringement believe
should be the case."
Subsection (d) states that:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied
relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the
following: (1) derived revenue from acts which if performed
by another without his consent would constitute contributory
infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or authorized another
to perform acts which if performed without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3) sought
to enforce his patent rights against infringement or contributory
infringement.
As to this subsection, the revisers interpret it as meaning that
'ca patentee is not deemed to have misused his patent solely by reason
of doing anything authorized by the section." Note the word "solely."
The Senate Report on the bill also states as to these provisions that
"one who merely does what he is authorized to do by statute is not
guilty of misuse of the patent" and that they "have as their main
purpose clarification and stabilization."
In view of these statements, I suggest there is considerable substance to the view that no substantial- change in existing law was
intended. Certainly there does not appear to be anything in the code
which would affect antitrust cases under the Sherman and Clayton
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Acts, or the assertion of defense based on violation of these acts in
private cases. It would appear that subsection (d) purports to deal
only with patent misuse in connection with patent infringement, the
subject of the whole section. Even if there were any semblance of
conflict, judicial policy as reflected in the cases would indicate the
antitrust statutes would prevail. The courts do not favor repeal of
a statute by implication, particularly when the subject matter is not
the same.
With respect to the doctrine of misuse in private litigation, apart
from any violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the courts have
condemned any scheme whereby the patent is extended to include unpatented goods. The code provision is not necessarily inconsistent, for
arguably it says in effect that the fact a patentee is enforcing his
patent shall not, in itself, constitute misuse.
The proponents of the subsection indicated to the House Judiciary
Subcommittee that they thought it would overrule the Mercoid and
other like cases. The Department opposed enactment because of the
danger that such a view might ultimately prevail. As I have already
indicated, the revisers and the Congress do not appear to share the
view that any change in the case law was intended or accomplished.
The argument of the proponents is that all that the patentee was doing
in the Mercoid and similar cases was to enforce his patent rights by
suits for contributory infringement and that the code states this is
not a patent misuse. It is, of course, impossible to tell how the courts
will treat this argument, but it should be kept in mind that the courts
generally look at the whole purpose and effect of a particular practice. A case 10 decided by the District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania on September 8, 1952 makes this clear and points
up the whole problem.
In that litigation, the plaintiff had a patent covering a method of
transferring a loop of yarn or other material from one needle to another. It was a manufacturer of unpatented knitting machines, and
sold them with an implied license to use the process. The suit was
against a competitor, who also manufactured and sold knitting machines, for contributory infringement. This consisted of defendant's
supplying its machines to knitting mill customers who infringed the
process by their use of the machines. The defendant was also alleged
to have directly infringed by test runs of its own machines. Plaintiff
announced the institution of the suit in releases to trade journals,
advising the trade that knit goods manufacturers using defendant's
machines would be infringing the patent.
The court held plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the suit
10acquard Knitting Machine Co. v. Ordnance Gauge Co., Inc., 95 U.S.P.Q. 28.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

because it was an attempt to extend the monopoly of the patent to
unpatented articles.
The court reasoned as follows:
"The ordinary situation in cases in which the rule has been
applied is where the patentee by a system of contracts or written
licenses has required anyone who wishes to make use of his
patent to buy unpatented materials from him and has refused to
license anyone who does not. In the present case the plaintiff
has no such system. It has not granted any written licenses to
manufacturers to use its method, although it necessarily grants
an implied license to every such manufacturer who buys one of
its machines. The notice of the institution of this suit which it
broadcast to the trade carries the clear implication that those
who use the defendant's machines may be sued for infringement ....
"It is plain that the plaintiff is primarily interested in eliminating competition in the manufacture of knitting machines,
rather than obtaining the fruits of its method patent within the
limits of the patent monopoly. However, I do not think that the
motives of the plaintiff are particularly important. The question
is, what effect will the restraint of infringement in any particular case have upon not only the rights of the defendant but upon
the public interest. Will it give the patentee a partial monopoly
beyond that which the patent law intends him to have? ...
"One must recognize the fact that to apply the rule of the
Carbice and Mercoid cases to a case like this cuts away a great
deal of the doctrine of contributory infringement and probably
diminishes the value to the owner of many method patents. The
Supreme Court fully recognized this in Mercoid Corp. v. MidContinent Co., 320 U. S. 661, 669, when it is said 'where there is
a collision between the principle of the Carbice case and the
conventional rules governing either direct or contributory infringement, the former prevails.'"
The case, as the court recognized, involved a close question under
present law. Undoubtedly, the new statute would give the plaintiff a
new argument on the point, but even so, I suggest the court might
well arrive at the same result.
PRICE FIXING AND POOLING

Important antitrust decisions handed down by the Supreme Court
in the patent field this year include those in the New Wrinkle" and
1
Besser cases. 2
The New Wrinkle case involved the validity of price fixing provisions in patent license agreements. You will recall that in the
General Electric case,' 3 the Supreme Court had held a patentee-manufacturer could legally license another to make and sell the patented
11 U.S.

v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371, 72 S.Ct. 350, 96 L.Ed. 275 (1952).
12 Besser Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 343 U.S. 444, 72 S.Ct, 838, 96 L.Ed. 757 (1952).
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product at fixed prices. The fairly recent Line Material case 4 however, had narrowed the scope of this earlier decision and had held
that two or more patentees could not combine their patents and fix
prices in their license agreements. The court was equally divided as
to overruling the General Electric case in its entirety. Indeed, one is
justified, it seems to me, in wondering whether or not there is any
residual value left of that decision.
In the Gypsum case' 5 the Supreme Court had also invalidated a
price fixing system in which the company licensed all members of an
industry. The fact that this price system was imposed by means of
patent licenses was held to be no defense.
This was the situation when the New Wrinkle case came up. There,
two competitors had engaged in litigation as to their respective patents
covering the manufacture of wrinkle finish enamels. They settled this
dispute by organizing a new jointly owned company to which they
transferred their patents. The new company licensed the patents to
over 200, or substantially all, manufacturers of wrinkle finishes in the
United States, in agreements containing price fixing provisions. The
court held this scheme to be illegal, saying:
"We see no material difference between the situation in Line
Material and Gypsum and the case presented by the allegations
of this complaint. An arrangement was made between patent
holders to pool their patents andn6 fix prices on the products for
themselves and their licensees.'
Apropos this decision, Newburgh Moire Co., Inc. v. Superior Moire
Co., Inc.,17 decided by the New Jersey District Court on June 5, 1952,
should be mentioned. There, plaintiff sued for infringement of a
process patent for producing so-called moire pattern effects in fabrics.
Defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff had violated
the antitrust laws and misused its patent by entering into minimum
price agreements with its licensees.
Plaintiff was one of five moire finishers in the United States and
had licensed two of the others under agreements which established a
minimum price list for the goods so processed . Neither party to the
suit manufactured any goods itself, but merely processed them.
The court considered this arrangement as falling within the ban
of the Gypsum and New Wrinkle cases. It thought that the Supreme
Court in New Wrinkle had extended the Gypsum holding, since there
all manufacturers in an industry v-re licensed, while in New Wrinkle,
only "substantially all" had been It stated that it was going one step
v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 47 S.Ct. 192, 71 L.Ed. 362 (1926).
U.S. v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 68 S.Ct. 550, 92 L.Ed. 701 (1948).

13 U.S.
14

15 U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
16Supra, note 11 at p. 380.
27 93 U.S.P.Q. 394.
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beyond the New Wrinkle decision in holding that price fixing in
licenses from a patent holder to two competitors out of five in an
industry was illegal.
The New Jersey court might well have mentioned and relied on
the Paramount casem where the Supreme Court, in considering the
vertical conspiracy between each distributor and its licensees under
copyright licenses, quoted with approval the finding of the District
Court that:
"In agreeing to maintain a stipulated minimum admission
price, each exhibitor thereby consests to the minimum price
level at which it will compete against other licensees of the
same distributor whether they exhibit on the same run or not.
The total effect is that through the separate contracts between
the distributor and its licensees a price structure is erected which
regulates the licensees' ability to compete against one another in
admission prices."
In the Besser case, which involved patent pooling, the Supreme
Court, in affirming the lower court, held that the company and others
had monopolized the concrete block industry.
The patent pooling arrangement was entered into by Besser, its
chief competitor Stearns (over which it subsequently gained control)
and the two inventors. It controlled 69 per cent of the dollar sales
of the industry and was held to be an illegal monopoly.
Under the agreement, the inventors licensed their patents, which
were of revolutionary importance in the industry, to Besser and
Stearns, with the stipulation that no other licenses would be given
without the consent of these two licensees. The lower court had stated:
"We believe that the contract under question goes further
than is necessary to protect the patent monopoly of Gelbman
and Andrus [the inventors]. It may well be that an exclusive
license to one party would be valid, but here the patentees have
joined hands with the two largest competitors in the industry
and by terms of their agreement have virtually made it impossible for others to obtain rights under those patents. The con'ract even gives Stearns and Besser the power to restrict competition-present and future-by requiring their joint consent before licensing others. It is this combination requiring collective
action that primarily invalidates the agreement."' 9
In speaking of the overall contractual patent picture, the court
pointed out that "such conditions while not illegal, per se, cannot be
justified as necessary to the enjoyment of or ancillary to the patent
rights conveyed."
I probably shouldn't leave this topic of patent pooling without menIsU.S. v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260 (1948).
19 96 F.Supp. 304, 311 (1951).
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tioning the recent interesting decisions in Kobe, Inc. v.Dempsey Pump
Co.,20 decided by the 10th Circuit, and Zenith Radio Corporation v.
Radio Corporationof America.21
All these recent cases (and no doubt others could be mentioned)
make pertinent the observation that as regards patent pooling and price
fixing, the courts have shown no indication of retreating from positions previously spelled out. If anything, the direction is the reverse.
COMPULSORY

LICENSING

Compulsory licensing is, to say the least, a rather controversial
subject. This is especially true when the compulsion takes the form of
requiring royalty-free licenses. Nevertheless, this device of compelling defendants to license their patent, either on a reasonable royalty
basis or less frequently without any royalties whatsoever, is a very
important one in antitrust litigation.
I assume most, if not all, of you are generally familiar with the
du Pont-I.C.L case 22 recently decided by Judge Ryan in the Southern
District of New York. The Government had sought compulsory royalty-free licensing of all the nylon patents on the theory that such a
device was necessary to establish competition in that very important
product. As to the other patents involved, it requested reasonable
royalty licensing. The court refused to require royalty-free licensing
because "we hold that in the circumstances before us, compulsory
royalty-free licensing may not be decreed in the absence of legislative
authority and the sanction of explicit interpretation of existing statutes by higher courts affiirmatively permitting such action."
It must be conceded that the court in ruling as it did was following
a safe course in view of the present state of the law. As you may
recall, the Supreme Court in Hartford-Empire Co. v. U. S.2 3 refused
to sanction royalty-free licensing saying:
"But if, as we must assume on this record, a defendant owns
valid patents, it is difficult to say that, however much in the past
such defendant has abused the rights thereby conferred, it must
now dedicate them to the public."

Also, in U. S. v. National Lead Co.,

24

where the District Court

had refused to order royalty-free licensing, the Supreme Court stated:
"On the facts before us, neither the issuance of such licenses
on a royalty free basis nor the issuance of a permanent injunction prohibiting the patentees and licensees from enforcing those
patents has been shown to be necessary in order to enforce
effectively the Antitrust Act. We do not, in this case, face the
20 94

2195

U.S.P.Q. 43 (1952).

U.S.P.Q. 64 (D.C. Del., 1952).

22 U.S. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. et al., 105 F.Supp. 215 (1952).
23 323
24 332

U.S. 386, 65 S.Ct. 373, 89 L.Ed. 322 (1945).
U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634, 91 L.Ed. 2077 (1947).
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issue of the constitutionality of such an order. That issue would
arise only in a case where the order would be more necessary
and appropriate to the enforcement of the Antitrust Act than
here."
While recognizing that an argument can be made to the contrary,
it has been, and still is, the Department's position that the requirement
of royalty-free licensing is not only necessary relief in an appropriate,
but rather rare, case, but when so used is entirely legal. Accordingly,
it has, in what were deemed to be the proper situations, insisted on
such a requirement in consent judgments. Moreover, the District
Court in the American Can25 case did not feel the Supreme Court
decisions precluded it from orerly royalty-free licensing of certain
patents of the defendant. In the Alcoa case, 28 Judge Knox eliminated
the grantback provisions of the defendant's existing licenses of certain
basic patents, thus depriving it of the only return it had from the
licensees.
The court in the I. C. I. case gave extensive relief by way of
compelling the defendants to license numerous patents, including
nylon, on a reasonable royalty basis, because "the patent rights which
were granted the defendants were misused." The opinion of the court
sets out the basis for such relief in these words:
"When he [the patentee] accepts the special privilege of a
patent, he obligates himself to exercise his patent rights in conformity with the law. Misue of these rights for an unlawful
purpose subjects their further use to regulation and control; in
this respect patent rights do not differ essentially in character
from any other rights which the law creates or recognizes ....
To us, it seems that an effective method to establish competitive
conditions is to decree compulsory licensing of all patents which
were licensed among the conspirators and which were put to use
in the production of products which were common to some if
not to all." 27
It may be noted that the Supreme Court in the Besser case upheld
the same principle that "compulsory patent licensing is a well-recognized remedy where patent abuses are proved in antitrust actions and
it is required for effective relief.1

28

In the Besser case, however, the Suprme Court went further than
Judge Ryan was willing to go in the I. C. L case for it affirmed a final
judgment requiring defendants to license to all applicants future
patents issued or applied for within ten years from the entry of judgment. Judge Ryan would not order the compulsory licensing of future
25 U.S.

v. American Can Co., 87 F.Supp. 18 (D.C. Cal., 1949).
(D.C. S.D.N.Y., 1950).

28 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F.Supp. 333

27Supra, note 22 at pp. 225-226.
28 Supra, note 12.
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patents as such. He did, however, include improvement patents issued
or assigned to defendants during a five-year period.
I might also mention the fact that the Supreme Court for the first
time, in the Besser case, upheld the lower court's requirement that
the lessees of Besser's patented machines must be given the option to
purchase them. This is an interesting parallel to the doctrine of compulsory licensing of abused patents.
Mention should also be made of another significant provision of
the I. C. I. judgment, namely, the provision that the acquisition of a
license from the defendants under American patents automatically
grants the licensee immunity under corresponding foreign patents.
CONCLUSION

If time permitted-and it does not-it would be interesting to
discuss other recent developments in this combined field of patentantitrust law. One of the most intriguing subjects is that of reciprocal
licensing under the Sherman Act-and I've barely referred to it tonight. Others, no doubt, could be mentioned.
The fundamental responsibility of the Antitrust Division is that of
enforcing the antitrust laws, of which the Sherman Act is no doubt
the most important and of the widest scope. In discharging that duty,
we necessarily get into the patent field, because patents play an important part in the violations we are called upon the prosecute and with
respect to which relief must be worked out. Enforcement, in other
words, is our job, and its effectiveness is of concern to the American
people and to the Congress.
In closing, I would like to point out, as the Supreme Court has
done several times, that the public policy of the patent laws is akin
to and basically the same as that of the antitrust laws. Both aim at
a vigorous free competitive enconomy. It is only when patents are
abused that patentees run afoul of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Patentees and licensees who do not abuse the patent grant need haveno fear of being hailed into court on the charge of violating the antitrust laws.

